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Reflections on Welfare
-

BY JEFFREY LEHMAN

AND SHELDON DANZIGER

During the 1992 presidential campaign,
Candidate Clinton promised, in Putting
People First, "to make work pay" and to
"end welfare as we know it":
"It's time to honor and reward people
who work hard and play by the rules. That
means ending welfare as we know it not
by punishing the poor or preaching to
them, but by empowering Americans to
take care of their children and improve
their lives. No one who works full-time
and has children at home should be poor
anymore. No one who can work should be
able to stay on welfare forever."
S hortly after taking office, President
Clinton created a Welfare Reform Task Force
to translate the campaign rhetoric into draft
legislation. The Task Force interpreted its
mandate to be to craft a reform of the program
that most people know as "welfare" -Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) .
The reform was expected to resonate with "the
basic American values of work, family, responsibility, and opportunitY:" 1
Welfare reform debates have always been,
at least implicitly, about the four values invoked by the Task Force. Since AFDC was first
created by the Social Security .Act of 1935,
each generation has changed the program to
reestablish its understanding of what is required to respect those values while providing
cash assistance for the "truly needy." Each
round of statutory amendments has
recalibrated the balance among (i) the interests
of needy single parents, (ii) the interests of
needy children, and (iii) the interests of the
larger society in expressing its commitment to
all four values.
To be sure, it is not easy to forge a legislative
consensus (much less a societal consensus) on
how the balance should be recalibrated. In the
middle of 1994, the administration sent to
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Congress a proposed Work and Responsibility Act (hereafter, the Clinton Plan). Other
legislators offered alternative plans during the
103rd Congress, both more liberal and more
conservative. Ultimately, however, the first
two years of the Clinton Administration elapsed
without either house giving even serious com-

mittee consideration to a welfare reform bill.
When the new Congress convenes in 1995,
it is more likely that welfare reform will be an
early and important item on the legislative
agenda. And the debates will be cast in terms
of the key values of work, family, responsibility, and opportunity. Many observers would

Reform

like there to be a simple answer to the question, "How should we want our legislators to
act?" In this article, we suggest why no simple
answer is available. We instead set forth some
of the background empirical and analytic considerations that we hope will inform our next
round of difficult collective self-definition.

AFDC Today

PHOTO BY THOMAS TREUTER

Aid to Families with Dependent Children is
an income support program that responds to
immediate financial hardship. It embodies a
commitment to support a subgroup of the
poor that was, at one time, thought blameless:
low-income families with young children and
a missing or financially incapacitated breadwinner. To qualify for benefits, a family must
generally show that it has virtually no assets,
that it has very low income (each state sets its
own ceiling), and that a child in the family is
deprived of at least one parent's support because the parent is (a) not livingwith the child,
(b) incapacitated, or (c) a recently unemployed primary breadwinner.
AFDC is almost entirely a program for
single mothers and their children. A few single
fathers participate, and a somewhat larger
number of two-parent families satisfy the stringent requirements for two-parent eligibility.
But among the roughly 4.8 million families
receiving AFDC benefits in a typical month in
fiscal yearl992, about 90 percent were fatherless.
As for mother-only families, AFDC has two
aspects: an insurance aspect and a long-term
support aspect. Many people fail to appreciate
the extent to which AFDC is, today, a form of
short-term insurance for disrupted families.
Roughly half of all families that begin a welfare
spell leave the rolls within one or two years.
For those families, AFDC ensures a meager but
potentially vital safety net. In 1994, a welfare
mother with two children and no earnings
received $366 in cash and $295 in Food
Stamps in the median state, or about 69 percent of the poverty line. Importantly, AFDC
also qualifies the family for health insurance in
the form of Medicaid.
The long-term support aspect of AFDC is
reflected in the fact that almost half of all
recipients remain beneficiaries for more than
two years. States have small programs to help
longer-term recipients make a transition back
to the paid work force. Those transitional
programs fall under the umbrella ofJOBS, the
job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training
program created by the 1988 Family Support
Act.
l.Los Angeles Times, Jan. 17, 1994.
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Some AFDC recipients are exempt from
the obligation to participate in JOBS (most
notably, mothers of children under 3 years
old, although some states have limited the
exemption to mothers of children under 1
year old). A non-exempt recipient may continue to receive benefits only by complying
with all legitimately imposed JOBS requirements. But, if the state has not appropriated
sufficient funds to provide a JOBS slot, the
recipient need not do anything more. As of
1992, on average states were providingJOBS
slots for only about 16 percent of their nonexempt participants.2 Under current law, each
state will have to place at least 20 percent of
non-exempt participants during fiscal year
1995 or face the prospect of losing some
federal funds.

The Economic Context
of Welfare Reform
Perhaps the most significant change in
America's welfare programs over the past two
decades is the decline in the level of cash
benefits they provide. Throughout that period, inflation has eroded the effective purchasing power of a welfare grant; moreover,
during the 1990s, many states have even cut
benefits in nominal terms. Thus, in the median state, the combined AFDC and Food
Stamp benefit was about 70 percent of the
poverty line for a nonworking mother with
two children in the early 1990s - down from
about 85 percent in the mid-1970s. 3
The declining economic position of AFDC
recipients is, to be sure, not unique. The past
two decades have been characterized by economic distress for the middle class, the working poor, and the unemployed, as well as for
welfare recipients. We have had relatively
little economic growth over the past generation, and the gains from growth have been
very uneven. In the two decades following
World War II, a rising tide lifted all boats.
2.

House Ways and Means Committee, 1994,
pp. 357-59.

3.

In addition, a smaller percentage of poor
children now receive welfare benefits. The ratio
of children receiving AFDC benefits to the total
number of poor children rose from about 20
percent in 1965 to about 80 percent in 1973 as
a result of the program expansions set in
motion by the War on Poverty and Great
Society legislation. This ratio fell to about 50
percent in 1982 as the Reagan budgetary
retrenchment went into effect, before rising to
about 63 percent in 1992.

4.

See Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk, eds.,

Uneven Tides: Rising Inequality in America,
Russell Sage Foundation, 1993.
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During economic recoveries, all gained - the
poor as well as the rich, the less skilled as well
as the most skilled. During the 1980srecovery,
however, a rising tide became an "uneven
tide," as the gaps widened between the rich
and the poor and between the most skilled
workers and the least skilled workers. 4
In America to
day, economic
hardship is remarkably wide
spread. Popular
portrayals of
economic hardship often focus
on inner-city
poverty or
single-mother
families or displaced factory
workers, and associate poverty
with their lack
of work effort or
lack of skills.
But during the
1980s, inequalities increased within most broader groups
across the population as well.While whitecollar workers fared•'better on average than
blue-collarworkers, and married-couple families fared better on average than mother-only
families, many white-collar workers and many
workers in married-couple families were also
laid off or experienced lower real earnings.
Not even the most educated groups were
spared. To be sure, the average college graduate continues to earn much more than less
educated workers, and the earnings of the
average college graduate grew much faster
than the earnings of other workers in the
1980s. Nonetheless, a college degree no longer
guarantees high wages. In 1991, among 25-to34 year old college graduates (without postcollege degrees), 16 percent of men and 26
percent of women worked at some time during
the year but earned less than the poverty line
for a family of four persons.5
The general structure of today's labor market has important implications for current
debates about welfare reform. Because most
welfare recipients have limited education and
labor market experience, the contemporary
economy offers them fewer opportunities even
when unemployment ratesare low. Moreover,
in many communities, the unemployment rate
has exceeded 6 percent for most of the past 15
years; in many inner cities, the unemployment
rate is well above 10 percent. And the shift in
the skill mix required in today's economy
means that, even if an employer extends a job

It is thus simply
not the case
that most of
today's welfare
recipients could
obtain jobs that
would lift them
andtheir
children out
of poverty, if
only they would
try harder.

offer to a welfare recipient with low skills and
experience, that employer is not likely to pay
very much.
It is thus simply not the case that most of
today's welfare recipients could obtain jobs
that would lift them and their children out of
poverty, if only they would try harder. Fear of
destitution is obviously a powerful incentive
to survive; it is not, however, adequate to give
an unskilled worker a legal way to earn her
family out of poverty. The harsh realities of
today's labor market mean that changes in
welfare mothers' economic incentives are unlikely to make much of a difference unless they
are accompanied by changes in their economic opportunities.
As long as America remains committed to
the view that a child should not have to live in
poverty merely because his or her single parent is unemployable, debates about welfare
reform should continue to be primarily debates about what kind of government intervention we would like to support. Do we want to
continue to support families outside the paid
work force? Or do we want to try to improve the
labor market prospects for welfare recipients?
In the first instance, these are questions about
whether a single parent's care for her own
child is a sufficiently important contribution
to the larger society, in and of itself, to warrant
public support.

Welfare Reform, Work,
and Opportunity
The most widely discussed aspect of the
current welfare reform debates is "two years
and out": the proposal that, after two years, an
AFDC parent's obligations would change so
much that one could appropriately say that
they are no longer on welfare. When it is
suggested that the Clinton proposal would ·
end welfare as we know it, the implicit claim
is that such a change in the structure of AFDC
would signal a radical shift in society's expectations of single mothers. It is useful to situate
such a claim in a broader historical context of
legislative reform. The evolution of AFDC
since 193 5 has reflected a steady change in the
implicit understanding of what it means for a
single mother to work.
In AFDC's early years, the implicit concept
of work was linked to other markers of social
status. A stylized interpretation of conditions
during the 1930s and 1940s might run as
follows: White widows "worked" vicariously
through their late husbands and directly by
maintaining a "suitable home" for their children. Over time, more white divorcees and
unwed mothers claimed welfare benefits; they
"worked" by satisfying the suitable home stan-

<lard and, if the caseworker thought they were
capable, by accepting "appropriate" work for
wages. During that same time period, and
especially in the south, black single mothers
were expected to do whatever house or field
work was demanded by local employers. In all
cases, the mother, through her "appropriate
behavior," justified public support for the
fatherless child.
During the late 1960s, the federal AFDC
statute began to embody a different notion of
what kind of work was required from single
mothers in return for welfare. In response to
growing public dissatisfaction over the rising
welfare caseload - one which coincided with
a rapid increase in married white women's
participation in the paid labor force - Congress amended the statute to provide greater
economic incentives for maternal labor force
participation and to provide that some women
(although, admittedly, few at first) would be
required to participate in work training programs.
Since 1967, the statutory expectation for
work force participation by single mothers has
steadily expanded. Traditionally, mothers of
very young children were exempted. But over
time, the definition of a "very young" child has
fallen from under 6 to under 3 (and, at state
option, to under 1). At the same time, Congress has appropriated progressively larger
amounts of money to fund state programs that
attempt to move mothers off welfare and into
a job.
Thus, contemporary discussions of two
years and out might be viewed as a straightforward extension of the trends from the recent
past. On the other hand, the current proposals
might also be seen as an attempt to accelerate
the historical trend by putting a strict two-year
limit on the time during which single mothers
may fulfill their societal responsibility merely
by rearing their own children.
One can capture some of the cultural stakes
behind two years and out with an analogy to
the world of insurance. The proposition that
welfare should not be a way of life.implies that
the "premium" a household pays to society by
rearing its own children is a limited one -one
that will only allow it to collect a limited
"insurance benefit" should it suddenly be struck
by the calamity of poverty. In other words,
proposals to create time-limited AFDC are
effectively proposals to make AFDC more like
time-limited unemployment insurance and
less like Social Security, whose benefits continue indefinitely.
Would some version of two years and out
constitute an improvement over the status
quo, or would it constitute an intolerable
reduction in the quality of our safety net for the

poor? The question requires an integration of
the symbolic message behind two years and
out with an appraisal of who is likely to be
helped and who is likely to be harmed by a
given proposal to implement the change. Before we outline how such an appraisal might
be conducted, let us consider the other important value that is implicated in welfare reform
debates.

Welfare Reform, Family Structure,
and Responsibility
The other value that has long been central
to welfare reform debates is the value of twoparent families. Can welfare protect children
from some of the economic costs of divorce
without encouraging divorce? Can welfare
protect children from some of the economic
costs of being born out of wedlock without
encouraging nonmarital births?
Such questions have always been an important part of welfare policy discussions.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, however, a
broad political consensus emerged that treated
other issues as paramount. The dominant concern was the challenge of maintaining a social
safety net while fighting the alienation of welfare recipients from the paid work force; family structure was a real,.l:mt decidedly secondary issue. The past twelve months, however,
have seen a crack in the consensus, as some
politicians have begun to take the position that
a concern with out-of-wedlock childbirth
should take precedence over child poverty
and non-participation in the work force.
The number of young children who live
with only one parent has skyrocketed during
the second half of the twentieth century. In
1960, only 9 percent of children under 18
lived with one parent, and less than 0.5 percent lived with a single parent who had never
married. In 1992, 27 percent of children under 18 lived with one parent, and 9 percent
lived with a single parent who had never
married.
Because AFDC is a program designed to
assist low-income children in one-parent
households, the demographics of AFDC recipient families have changed in tandem with
the changes in society as a whole. In 1935, the
"typical" AFDC family was headed bya widow.
In the 1950s, the AFDC parent was typically a
divorced or separated mother. But since the
mid- l 980s, a majority ofAFDC-recipient children have lived with a never-married parent.
In the past year, several legislators have
proposed denying AFDC benefits to children
born out ofwedlock. 6 They have oftenjustified
such proposals by invoking a Wall Street journal column that Charles Murray published last
year under the headline, 'The Coming White

Underclass."7 The column has proven to have
sufficient political importance to warrant a
thorough discussion.
In "White Underclass," Murray revived the
polemical style that he had deployed in Losing
Ground a decade earlier,8 constructing an argument with eight structural characteristics:
(1) Murray presented a troublesome social
fact. In Losing Ground, the troublesome fact
had been the increasing rate of pre-transfer
poverty. In "White Underclass", it was the
increasing rate ofout-of-wedlock childbearing.
(2) Murray presented the troublesome social fact in a variety of ways, using quantitative
measures from several different data sets.
(3) Murray speculated in apocalyptic terms
about the future implications of the troublesome social fact.
(4) Murray hinted darkly that the troublesome social fact had been concealed from the
average American. While "headlines" reported
one thing, Murray suggested that the "real
news" had been suppressed.
(5) Murray expressed his vision of society
in quotable aphorisms. ("In the calculus of
illegitimacy, the constants are that boys like to
sleep with girls and that girls think babies are
endearing. . .. Bringing a child into the world
when one is not emotionally or financially
prepared to be a parent is wrong. The child
deserves society's support. The parent does
not.")
(6) Murray offered a simple account of how
the troublesome social fact could (in theory)
have resulted from the rational responses of
self-interested individuals to government social welfare programs.
(7) Murray insisted that the troublesome
social fact would disappear if government
disappeared (in this case, by eliminating many
social welfare programs and denying an unwed mother any right to collect child support
from the child's father) .
(8) Finally, Murray offered assurances that
the costs of his recommendation would be
minimal because the world of private, voluntary exchange would be an effective substitute

5.

In 1991, the poverty line for a family of four was
$13,924. College graduates do indeed fare much
better than high school graduates. In 1991, 30
percent of the male and 57 percent of the female
high school graduates earned less than $13,924.

6.

See, e.g., The Welfare Reform Act of 1994, H.R.
4566, 103rd Cong. , 2d Sess.

7.

Wall Street]oumal, Oct. 23, 1993; see also
Charles Murray, "Keep It In the Family," London
Sunday Times, Nov. 14, 1993.

8.

Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social
Policy, 1950-1980, New York: Basic Books, 1984.
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for the public safety net. (How does a poor
young mother survive without government
support? The same way she has since time
immemorial.)
An important part of what makes Murray's
polemic effective is the clever way it baits
academics. The structural characteristics (3), (4),
and (5) in the list above seem calculated to goad
professorial critics into making analytically
sound but politically unpersuasive criticisms.
Consider an example. In Murray's argument, a key premise is that having a child out
of wedlock is detrimental to both the mother
and the child - a premise that would meet
little resistance with the general public and
that would seem to be supported by data
showing a correlation between nonmarital
births and unfavorable measured outcomes.
To an academic reader, however, Murray's
claim seems to cry out for one of two responses. First, any observed correlations between out-of-wedlock childbearing and, say,
poverty might be spurious. Nonmarital birth
might not be the cause of poverty; it could be
the consequence when young people grow up
in impoverished surroundings and see little
potential for escaping their conditions. Alternatively, both nonmarital births and poverty
might be caused by some other pernicious
social force.
Second, even a supposedly causal connection could be contingent. In other words, even
if illegitimacy is harmful under today's conditions, it might not be so harmful if social
programs or educational or economic opportunities could be changed.
As a theoretical matter, these responses to
Murray are completely sound. Social science
methods are too limited to provide incontrovertible proof of social causation. And social
phenomena are virtually all contingent. Our
point, however, is that, while such responses
might expose theoretical weaknesses in Murray's
argument, they do not present counter-evidence to demonstrate that the relationship
between out-of-wedlock births and poverty is
in fact spurious. Nor do they demonstrate that
American society could realistically be transformed to make the phenomenon benign. For
policymakers, the knowledge that a social fact
might not be inevitably troublesome is worth
very little, especiallyifMurray's "troublesome"
thesis (if not the "apocalypse" thesis) resonates
with most people's intuitions about how the
world works and is likely to continue to work.
Yet it would be terribly unfortunate if academic criticism of Murray's argument got
bogged down in the logical failings of the way
he used characteristics (3), (4), and (5). The
danger is that the serious flaws reflected in
38
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characteristics (6), (7), and (8) would remain
unexposed. Accordingly, for purposes of discussion, let us stipulate that out-of-wedlock
birth is a troublesome social phenomenon and
that its recent rise is a troublesome social fact.
Let us even stipulate that government might
consider supplementing the War on Poverty
with Murray's War on Illegitimacy. The problem is that Murray has not even remotely
begun to make the case for the idea that the
first step in his War should be to deny unwed
mothers all access to the social safety net.
Here it is Murray who indulges in theoretically interesting but practicallyirrelevantspeculation. As a matter of pure theory, Murray
could well have been right that the structure of
AFDC eligibility brought about the rise in outof-wedlock births. But it is just as easy to
construct a story on the theoretical plane
about why Murray's account of the rise in
nonmarital childbearing is completely wrong.
The key point, ignored by Murray in "White
Underclass" just as he ignored it in I.nsing
Ground, is that merely knowing the direction of
an economic incentive does not tell us anything about how big an effect the incentive
actually has. When it comes to the decisions to
have sex, to bear a child, and to raise a child,
a host of other factors can easily dominate or
dwarf the effects of A'fDC's benefit structure.
If we offered you a dollar to jump off a building, the direction of the economic incentive
would be clear, but we would not expect to see
much of an effect in the real world. Likewise,
we know that an increase in the tax on cigarettes will reduce the incentive to smoke, but
it has not been shown that taxation is the most
effective way to reduce smoking.
Even more importantly, we do not need to
resign ourselves to this stand-off in the world
of purely theoretical speculation. For many
years, social scientists have been diligently
measuring the effects of welfare's incentives on
family structure. In a recent comprehensive
review of the literature, Robert Moffitt considered the time-series data. 9 He concluded, "the
evidence does not support the hypothesis that
the welfare ~ystem has been responsible for the
time-series growth in female headship and
illegitimacy."
He then considered the econometric analyses of the effects of variations in the level of
welfare benefits on the likelihood that a child
lives with two parents.10 Moffitt concluded
that while studies undertaken during the
1980s had begun to show some evidence of a
detectable effect on rates of female headship,
the magnitude of the effect was small. "The
failure to find strong benefit effects is the most
notable characteristic of this literature [on the
relationship between welfare and female

headship]." Summarizing the studies that
looked specifically at the relationship between
welfare benefits and nonmarital childbearing,
Moffitt concluded that there was mixed evidence of any effect at all.
In sum, the statistical evidence fails to
support Murray's strong historical claims that
the current "crisis of illegitimacy" resulted
from the structure of AFDC. It offers even less
reason to believe Murray's suggestion that we
could dramatically reduce out-of-wedlock
births by denying unwed mothers access to
public support and by freeing unwed fathers
of all child support obligations.
If one were serious about reducing
nonmarital childbearing, what kinds of reforms might one consider? What changes
might increase the relative benefits (or reduce
the relative costs) of deferring childbearing,
without significant attendant social harms?
For any high school graduate who had not
borne or fathered a child out of wedlock, the
government might subsidize higher education, or provide a guaranteed job, or do more
to ensure that any opportunity provided for
single mothers trying to get off welfare will be
equally available to young women who
avoided welfare by not having a child.

Thinking about
Welfare Reform in 1995
One way to frame the ultimate policy question is as follows: Should a member of Congress endorse the Clinton Plan? That question
raises a number of difficult considerations of
political strategy that we can only note here.
For example:
• The "crowding" problem. One might
rationally believe that the Clinton Plan is an
improvement over the status quo, but nonetheless oppose it because one believes an even
bigger improvement is politically attainable if
the Clinton Plan is rejected,but will be crowded
off the policy agenda if the Clinton Plan is
adopted.
• The "Frankenstein" problem. One might
rationally believe that the Clinton Plan is an
improvement over the status quo, but nonetheless believe that it will inevitably be transformed by the legislative process into a mutant
that is worse than the status quo.
• The "shifting baseline" problem. Even if

9.

"Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System:
A Review,"]oumal of Economic Literature, 1992.

10. Much of that literature is based on interstate
variations in the level of benefits. In 1992 the
combined value of AFDC and Food Stamps for
a family of three ranged from $456 to $798 in
the contiguous 48 states.

the next Congress does nothing, the status quo
will not continue. Over the past three years,
the image of a coherent national AFDC program has become less and less accurate, as
governors have received waivers to implement
their own versions of welfare reform. 11 Thus, a
legislator should be comparing the Clinton
Plan not with the status quo, but rather with a
projection of how AFDC will continue to
evolve in the absence of Congressional action.
Before one begins to undertake such complex tactical judgments, however, one must
come to terms with simpler questions. Given
the general framework of welfare reform issues
that is on the table at the present time, how
might one recognize a package of changes that
could plausibly constitute an improvement
over the status quo?
The Clinton Plan introduced in 1994 set
the initial terms for negotiation. It proposed
that a young parent should be given a complete exemption from work force participation
for only twelve months after the birth of a first
child, and twelve weeks after the birth of a
child conceived while the parent was on
AFDC. (Exemptions would also be available
for a limited number of others.) Outside of
exempt periods, the parent would have a
lifetime "bank" of 24 months during which she
could participate in AFDC and JOBS. By working in the paid work force, a parent could
replenish that bank to provide emergency
"cushions" of up to six months at a time. Once
the time for AFDC and JOBS participation was
exhausted, the parent would either have to
find a job in the paid work force or else
participate in a special program known as
WORK. 12
WORK would offer subsidies to public or
private employers to encourage them to take
on AFDC recipients in work-like positions;
the employer would pay a "paycheck" in an
amount that equaled the former welfare check,
in exchange for however many hours of work
that amount could buy at the minimum wage
(or, if higher, at the wage the employer otherwise paid for comparable work). The WORKer
would be eligible for special child care subsidies and for Medicaid, but not for the Earned
Income Tax Credit that is made available to
holders of mainstream jobs.
The Clinton Plan would also increase child
support enforcement efforts. It would not
deny benefits to unmarried mothers, but it
would deny benefits to mothers who are unable to identify all possible fathers or are
unwilling to help locate them. And it would
require all teenage parents to live with an adult
relative unless the home circumstances were
dangerous or no adult relatives were willing to
have the teenager in the home.

There could be
enonnous social
benefits
associated with
a meaningful
expansion of
opportunity for
people who are
currently unable
to participate
effectively in the
workforce.

Without necessarily endorsing
the Clinton Plan
as written, we
can comfortably
conclude
that it provides
an appropriate
framework for
discussion. On
the one hand,
there are profound social
costs associated
with any
changes that risk
reducing support to needy
children. On the
other hand, the
status quo has proven inadequate to meet the
needs and desires of AFDC parents to participate in the paid work force . The Clinton Plan
proposes to invest an additional $9 billion to
$11 billionoverfiveyearsinchildcare, WORK
wage subsidies, education, training, and job
placement. There could be enormous social
benefits associated with a meaningful expansion of opportunity for people who are currently unable to participate effectively in the
work force.
Five of the key analytic questions are these:
(1) Will the daily care experiences of children whose parents are affected by a timelimited welfare system be better or worse? The
empirical literature on this point is inconclusive. We are aware of no studies that consider
the effects of different forms of child care
(maternal or paid) on the children of welfare
recipients. One can imagine that the 2-yearold child of a disadvantaged welfare recipient
might benefit from the stimulation of a day
care center; one could as easily imagine that
she might suffer from disruption in her intimate relationships. Ultimately, the effects on
children will necessarily reflect both (a) the
quality of the AFDC recipient child's new care
environment and (b) the extent to which
increased experience in the paid work force
provides the mother with a transition to a
higher standard of living and with a set of life
opportunities that make her a more successful
parent.
2) Will the new WORK positions provide
more effective pathways into the work force
than currently exist for welfare parents? Over
the years, the federal government has supported many different forms of job creation
and job training, from CETA through the WIN
Demonstration projects. Evaluations of those
programs have rarely shown huge long-term
benefits, but they have often shown noticeable

marginal improvements. Much will depend on
the details of program design and implementation.
3) Will the changes in young people's opportunity sets that might result from welfare reform
lead them to defer childbearing until more appropriate times? This is a question both about the
substance of reform and about the way in which
that substance comes to be understood by ordinary citizens. To the extent the impetus for welfare reform is a desire to shape behavior, the
effectiveness with which reform is explained to the
larger public may be as important as its actual
content.
4) What about universal health care? There is
some evidence for the proposition that the loss
of Medicaid is one of the biggest concerns of
welfare recipients considering work in the paid
work force. Under current law, people who
leave welfare are entitled to retain transitional
Medicaid benefits for a year. If one of the aims
of reform is to make paid work more attractive
than welfare, further discussion of health insurance remains a necessity.
5) How many people will fall through the
cracks, and how far will they fall? In most states,
AFDC is the last meaningful safety net for children
who live in poverty. Under a reformed system,
what will happen to those children whose parents
are unable orunwilling to comply with the greater
demands of that system?
Any reform package that aspires to make a
significant change along the dimensions of work,
family, responsibility, and opportunity will be
expensive. In the current economy, it will cost a
lot to create meaningfully expanded work opportunities for single parents who may lack marketable skills. But if welfare reform is to be worth
pursuing, it must proceed on a principle of balanced responsibility: welfare recipients and prospective parents must take responsibility for themselves and their children; the government must
take responsibility for providing meaningful employment opportunities for all. Only when everyone, regardless of fortune, has agreed to do more, will
it be appropriate to speak of a new social contract.

mm
11.

See Susan Bennett and Kathleen Sullivan,
Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare Reform,
Michigan journal of Law Reform, forthcoming, 1994,
and Michael Wiseman, Welfare Reform in the
States: the Bush Legacy, Focus, Institute for
Research in Poverty, University of Wisconsin,
Spring 1993.

12.

For any month in which a recipient worked a
specified number of hours, generally about halftime, her 24-month lifetime allocation would not
be reduced.
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